We derive a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of classical-quantum arbitrarily varying wiretap channel for both the case with and without channel state information at the transmitter.
Introduction
The arbitrarily varying channel models transmission over a channel with an state that can change over time. We may interpret it as a channel with an evil jammer. The arbitrarily varying channel was first introduced by Blackwell, Breiman, and Thomasian in [8] . The wiretap channel models communication with security. It was first introduced by Wyner in [12] . We may interpret it as a channel with an evil eavesdropper. The arbitrarily varying wiretap channel models transmission with both a jammer and an eavesdropper. Its capacity has been determined by Bjelaković, Boche, and Sommerfeld in [3] .
A quantum channel is a channel which can transmit both classical and quantum information. In this paper, we consider the capacity of quantum channels to carry classical information, or equivalently, the capacity of a classical quantum channels. The classical capacity of quantum channels has been determined by Holevo in [9] . A classical-quantum channel with a jammer is called a classical-quantum arbitrarily varying channel, its capacity has been determined by Ahlswede and Blinovsky in [1] . Bjelaković, Boche, Janßen, and Nötzel gave an alternative proof and a proof of the strong converse in [2] . A classical-quantum channel with an eavesdropper is called a classical-quantum wiretap channel, its capacity has been determined by Devetak in [7] , and by N. Cai, Winter, and Yeung in [5] .
A classical-quantum channel with both a jammer and an eavesdropper is called a classical-quantum wiretap channel, it is defined as a pair of double indexed finite set of density operators {(ρ x,t , σ x,t ) : x ∈ X , t ∈ Θ} with common input alphabet X connecting a sender with two receivers, one legal and one wiretapper, where t is called a state of the channel pair. The legitimate receiver accesses the output of the first channel ρ x,t in the pair (ρ x,t , σ x,t ), and the wiretapper observes the output of the second part σ x,t in the pair (ρ x,t , σ x,t ), respectively, when a state t, which varies from symbol to symbol in an arbitrary manner, governs both the legitimate receiver's channel and the wiretap channel. A code for the channel conveys information to the legal receiver such that the wiretapper knows nothing about the transmitted information. This is a generalization of model of classical-quantum compound wiretap channels in [4] to the case when the channel states are not stationary, but can change over the time.
We will be dealing with two communication scenarios. In the first one only the transmitter is informed about the index t (channel state information, or simply CSI, at the transmitter), while in the second, the legitimate users have no information about that index at all (no CSI).
Definitions
Let X be a finite set (the set of code symbols). Let Θ := {1, · · · , T } be finite set (the set of channel states). Denote the set of the (classical) messages by {1, · · · , J n }. Define the classical-quantum arbitrarily varying wiretap channel by a pair of double indexed finite set of density operators {(ρ x,t , σ x,t ) : x ∈ X , t ∈ Θ} on C d . Here the first family represents the communication link to the legitimate receiver while the output of the latter is under control of the wiretapper.
One important notation in [1] is the symmetrizable classical-quantum arbitrarily varying channel. We say {ρ x,t : x ∈ X , t ∈ Θ} is symmetrizable if there exists a parameterized set of distributions {U (t|x) : x ∈ X } on Θ such that for all x, x ′ ∈ X the following equalities are valid:
For any probability distribution P ∈ P and positive δ denote T n P,δ the δ-typical set in sense of [6] .
For a state ρ, the von Neumann entropy is defined as S(ρ) := −tr(ρ log ρ) .
Let P be a probability distribution over a finite set J, and Φ := {ρ(x) : x ∈ J} be a set of states labeled by elements of J. Then the Holevo χ quantity is defined as
A (deterministic) quantum code C of cardinality J n and length n is a set of pairs {(c
n , and {D j : j = 1, · · · J n } is a collection of positive semi-definite operators which is a resolution of the identity in (
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the classicalquantum arbitrarily varying wiretap channel if for every ǫ > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exist a code
, where W is an uniformly distributed random variable with values in {1, · · · J n }.
Here P e (C, t n ) (the average probability of the decoding error of a deterministic code C, when the state (sequence of states) of the classical-quantum arbitrarily varying wiretap channels is t n = (t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n )) is defined as follows
where ρ c n j ,t n := ρ cj,1,t1 ⊗ ρ cj,2,t2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ cj,n,tn . A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the classicalquantum arbitrarily varying wiretap channel with channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter if for every ǫ > 0, δ > 0, ζ > 0 and sufficiently large n there exist for every t n a code C
Here P CSI e (C t n , t n ) is defined as follows:
where ρ c t n j ,t n := ρ c n j,t n ,t1 ⊗ ρ c j,1,t n ,t2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ c j,n,t n ,tn . One tool we will use is the random quantum code, which we will define now.
The average probability of the decoding error is defined as follows
A non-negative number R is an achievable secrecy rate for the classicalquantum arbitrarily varying wiretap channel under random quantum coding if for every δ > 0, ζ > 0, and ǫ > 0, if n is sufficiently large, we can find a J n such that log J n n > R − δ ,
The following facts hold: (cf. [10] )
Let X ′ be a finite set and for any x ∈ X ′ , ς x be a density operator on
Then Π ς,α commuting with P ς and satisfying
, where a := #X ′ and K is a positive constant.
The subspace projector Π ς x n ,α commutes with ς x n and satisfies:
where K is a positive constant.
Main Result
Theorem 3.1. Let W := {(ρ x,t , σ x,t ) : x ∈ X , t ∈ Θ} be a classical-quantum arbitrarily varying wiretap channel, if for all t ∈ Θ it holds: {ρ x,t , x ∈ X } is not symmetrizable, then the largest achievable secrecy rate, called secrecy capacity, of W, is bounded as follow,
(1) where P are distributions on X , Q are distributions on Θ, and ρ
If {ρ x,t , ∈ X , t ∈ Θ} is not symmetrizable, then the secrecy capacity of W with CSI at the transmitter is bounded as follow
Is {ρ x,t , x ∈ X } symmetrizable for some t ∈ Θ, then we have:
Proof. At first, we are going to prove (1).
, where η is a positive constant.
be a family of random matrices such that their entries are i.i.d. according to P ′ .
Our proof bases on the following two lemmas. The first lemma is due to Rudolf Ahlswede and Vladimir Blinovsky, the second one (the Covering Lemma) is due to Rudolf Ahlswede and Andreas Winter.
Lemma 3.2 (cf. [1] ). Let {̺ x,t , x ∈ X , t ∈ Θ} be a classical-quantum arbitrarily varying wiretap channel, defined in sense of [1] , where X is the set of code symbols and Θ is the set of states of the classical-quantum arbitrarily varying wiretap channel. For {c
Define the the set of the quantum codes
x ∈ X } − δ, where δ is a positive constant, and assume {̺ x,t , x ∈ X , t ∈ Θ} is not symmetrizable. then following holds. For any ǫ > 0, if n is large enough, then there exist a distribution G on C such that 
Suppose that M ⊂ Y is a set of size |M| with elements {m}, C = {C m } m∈M is a random code where the codewords C m are chosen according to the distribution p Y (y), and an ensemble {σ Cm : m ∈ M} with uniform distribution on M, then
Let {X n j,l } j∈{1,··· ,Jn},l∈{1,··· ,Ln} be a family of random matrices such that the entries of {X 
6
−n[H(ρ x n ,t n )+α] }, and Π ρ x n ,t n ,α := k∈G t n x n ,α
By Lemma 3.4 (cf. [11] ). Let ρ be a state and X be a positive operator with X ≤ id (the identity matrix) and 1 − tr(ρX) ≤ λ ≤ 1. Then
and the fact that Π P ρ t n ,α √ a and Π ρ x n ,t n ,α are both projection matrices, for any t n and x n it holds:
Thus for any positive α and any positive η if n is large enough
Since
by applying covering lemma, for every t n and j ′ ∈ {1, · · · , J n } there is a positive constant c ′ 1 such that for any ν > 0,
Since |Θ n | = O(2 n ), and J n ≪ 2
, there is a positive constant c 1 such that for any ν > 0,
Denote the set of all codes
where (x j,l ) j=1,··· ,Jn,l=1,··· ,Ln are realizations of (X j,l ) j=1,··· ,Jn,l=1,··· ,Ln , such that
Now we want to show the following alternative result to Lemma 3.2.
If n is large enough then for any any positive ν, there exist a distribution G on C ′ ν such that max
In [1] , following inequality is shown. There is a positive constant c 2 such that for any positive ν P r
where c 2 is some positive constant. Since
There is a positive constant c 3 such that if n is large enough then
is not empty. This means if is large enough, then for any positive ν and for each set of distributions
ν with a positive probability such that,
Let us denote the set of distributions on C
. By applying the minimax theorem for mixed strategies (cf. [1] ), we have
Therefore (13) holds.
Now we are going to use the derandomization technique in [1] to build a deterministic code.
Consider now n 2 independent and identically distributed random variables
where λ := log(ν · e 2 + 1). If n is large enough then 1 − e −λn 2 is positive, this means C zi is a realization of Z i :
is not the empty set, since G(∅) = 0 by the definition of distribution.
In [1] , it is shown that if C zi is a realization of Z i :
is not the empty set, there exist codes
ν , where we denote
a positive probability such that
Following fact is trivial. There is a code (c
of length µ(n), where µ(n) = o(n) (this code does not need to be secure against the wiretapper, i.e. we allow the wiretapper to have the full knowledge of i), such that for any positive ϑ if n is large enough then
By (16) we can construct a code of length µ(n) + n (cf. [1] )
which is a juxtaposition of words of the code {(c
following feature. C det is a deterministic code with n 2 J n L n codewords such that for any positive ǫ if n is large enough then
Furthermore, since
Lemma 3.5 (Fannes inequality, cf. [11] ). Let X and Y be two states in a d-dimensional complex Hilbert space and
Let W be a random variable uniformly distributed on {1, · · · , J n }, by Lemma 3.5, for all t n ∈ Θ n and all i ∈ {1, · · · ,
Therefore for any ζ > 0 we can choose such η that for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n 2 } (i.e. even when the wiretapper has the full knowledge of i), for all t
By (17) and (19), we see that for any distribution P on X and any positive δ, we can find a (n, ǫ)-code with secrecy rate min Q χ P, {ρ Q x : x ∈ X } − 1 n max t n ∈Θ n χ (P n , {σ x n ,t n : x n ∈ X n }) − δ. Therefore (1) follows. Now, we are going to prove (2).
Fix P , let J n = 2 min Q∈Q,t n ∈Θ n [nχ(P,{ρ
χ(P,{σ x n ,t n :x n ∈X n })+nη , where η is a positive constant. For any
,··· ,L t n } be a family of random matrices whose components are i.i.d. according to P ′ .
Since L t n ≥ 2 χ(P n ,{σ x n ,t n :x n ∈X n })+2nδ = 2 x n P n (x n )S(ρ x n ,t n )+nδ 2 S ( x n P n (x n )ρ x n ,t n ) −nδ , by applying covering lemma, there is a positive c ′ 1 such that for any positive η we have: 
and for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n 2 } and all j ′ ∈ {1, · · · , J n }:
By Lemma 3.5, we have for all t n ∈ Θ n and all i ∈ {1, · · · , n
,t n : j = 1, · · · , J n ≤ 3η log d − 3η log 3η .
Therefore for any ζ > 0 we can choose such η that for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n 2 },
By (22) and (24), we see that for any distribution P on X and any positive δ, we can find a (n, ǫ)-code with secrecy rate min Q∈Q,t n ∈Θ n χ(P, {ρ Q x : x ∈ X }) − 1 n χ(P n , {σ x n ,t n : x n ∈ X n }) − δ. Therefore (2) holds.
Is {ρ x,t , x ∈ X } symmetrizable, then by [1] , even in the case without wiretapper (we have only the arbitrarily varying channel {ρ x,t : x ∈ X , t ∈ Θ} instead of the pairs {(ρ x,t , σ x,t ) : x ∈ X , t ∈ Θ}), the capacity is equal to 0. Since we cannot exceed the secrecy capacity of the worst wiretap channel, (3) holds.
